Brown v. Nutrition Management Services Co., 2009 WL 281118 (E.D.Pa.)

Plymouth House, a nursing home in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, hired Melissa Brown as the food service director in November 2002. Almost two years later, New Courtland, the owner of Plymouth House, contracted with Nutrition Management to oversee certain parts of the food service. Nutrition Management kept Brown on board to continue as the Plymouth House food service director.

In October 2004 (approximately two months later), Brown informed Nutrition Management that she was pregnant and would be seeking time off in the future. Nutrition Management terminated Brown’s employment at that time. Brown responded by filing suit against Nutrition Management, two of its employees and New Courtland alleging that her termination unlawfully interfered with her right to take leave under the FMLA. At trial, a jury found that Brown was eligible for leave under the FMLA; that Nutrition Management had interfered with her FMLA rights; and that the two employees were not individually liable.

The jury awarded Brown $74,000 in back pay as damages under the FMLA. Brown filed a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to include an award of $6,655.82 in pre-judgment interest on the back pay award, $80,655.82 in liquidated damages and $115,826.40 in front pay.

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In her motion, Brown claimed that she was entitled to pre-judgment interest under the FMLA. Nutrition Management argued that Brown is only entitled to either liquidated damages or pre-judgment interest but not both. Nutrition Management cited Martin v. Cooper Electric Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896 (3rd Cir. 1991) in support of its claim that a prevailing party under the FMLA cannot obtain both pre-judgment interest and liquidated damages. Martin was a case concerning the FLSA and not the FMLA.

The FMLA contains clear statutory language authorizing the recovery of both pre-judgment interest and liquidated damages: any employer who violates the FMLA shall be liable to the employee for damages equal to the amount of: (i) “any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation;” (ii) “the interest on the amount described in clause (i) calculated at the prevailing rate;” and (iii) “an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to the sum of the amount described in clause (i) and the interest described in clause (ii).”29 U.S.C. § 2617(a).

Brown requested $6,655.82 in pre-judgment interest on the back pay award, an amount calculated with the aid of the federal post-judgment rates under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The district court granted the request in that amount for pre-judgment interest.

Brown also sought liquidated damages under the FMLA. The FMLA provides that a prevailing party is entitled to liquidated damages equal to the amount of damages awarded for lost compensation plus interest unless the defendant’s “act or omission which violated [29 U.S.C. § 2615] was in good faith and [the defendant] had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation ….”29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A) (iii).

The FMLA, however, does not define “good faith.” In the Third Circuit, reasonable good faith requires a defendant to take affirmative steps to ascertain the requirements of the law. FLSA).“A defendant employer’s burden of proof is a difficult one to
meet. Double damages are the norm, single damages the exception.” Martin v. Cooper Electric Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 908-909 (3rd Cir. 1991).

The district court turned to the testimony established at trial to determine if Nutrition Management had acted in good faith. Joseph Roberts, chief executive officer of Nutrition Management, testified that:

(1) Brown was “laid off,” but not fired;
(2) Brown was terminated because Plymouth House’s management “asked to have her removed from the facility;” and
(3) he did not make the decision to fire Brown.

At trial, Roberts waffled on whether Brown had been fired or laid off and attempted to shift the blame to Plymouth House’s management.

Apparently, defense counsel did a poor job preparing his witnesses as Richard Blagrave, senior vice president of operations and chief operating officer of Nutrition Management, testified that:

(1) Mr. Roberts made the decision to terminate Brown; and
(2) when he asked Mr.Roberts whether the reasons for her termination should be documented, Mr. Roberts said “he wanted the fat bitch out of there.”

The district court gave no indication as to whether Roberts denied making the statement that “he wanted the fat bitch out of there.”

Detracting further from Nutrition Management’s credibility, Karen Zywalewski, a district manager at Nutrition Management, testified that she and Mr. Blagrave collectively made the decision to terminate Brown.

Defense counsel did not do any more favors for its client when he argued that his client had a reasonable belief that Brown’s termination would not violate the FMLA as Brown was a probationary employee and therefore ineligible for FMLA coverage. Scott Murray, Nutrition Management’s human resources director, testified that he gave the okay to terminate Brown as she was a “brand new employee.” Murray did no research into whether Brown’s prior employer was covered by the FMLA and whether Nutrition was a successor in interest when it kept Brown on staff. The district court determined that the cursory determination by Murray was not an adequate legal inquiry into the matter to establish good faith and awarded liquidated damages to Brown in an amount equal to the back pay award plus pre-judgment interest.

Brown also argued for front pay damages. At trial, the jury did not award her front pay. Through her motion, Brown contended that the jury’s response to the front pay interrogatory was unclear:

If you answered “yes” to any of Questions 2, 4, 6, in what amount, if any, has plaintiff,
Melissa Brown, proved by a preponderance of the evidence damages for future lost wages or financial benefits as a result of her termination?

The jury’s written response states, “OMIT per Judge’s instructions.”

On the issue of front pay, the court instructed the jury that: (1) damages should only be awarded if the jury found Brown was entitled to them; (2) front pay could be awarded to compensate Brown for future loss of income caused by Nutrition Management’s conduct; and (3) the jury should not reduce any award of front pay to reflect its present value because, by agreement of the parties, the court would do so.

With little reasoning, the district court determined that the jury chose to omit front pay damages because it found that Brown was not entitled to them. In a footnote, the district court did provide what it determined to be the relevant portions of the jury instructions concerning damages. Such inclusion served to further confuse the matter but may have supported the court’s determination that the jury chose not to make a front pay award.

In its haste to terminate Melissa Brown, Nutrition Management ended up costing itself an additional $80,000 in liquidated damages based upon its failure to thoroughly research the proposed termination. Employers would be well-advised seeking a second opinion from outside counsel on termination decisions.

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